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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper opens with a brief introduction to the development of crew resource and 
risk management training in the international shipping industry.  A review of three 
case studies is used to highlight some of the current risk management issues raised by 
recent maritime casualties. The paper provides an overview of how these issues have 
led to research-led developments in simulator-based maritime risk management 
training and assessment. The first development has been the design of more effective 
training courses through a better understanding of the nature of the skill requirements. 
The current training is outlined and other areas of research, which are now being 
undertaken, are described. The paper concludes with a summary of further research 
and development needs. 
1. The Development of Maritime CRM Training 
The use of simulation in providing solutions to the problems of risk and crisis 
management and the optimal use of crew resources has a long established pedigree in 
maritime training. The first simulators were introduced for radar training over thirty 
years ago. Training in the proper interpretation of radar information started as a result 
of a number of radar-assisted collisions in the 1950’s, notably the collision between 
the passenger ship “Andrea Doria” and the “Stockholm”. Those early simulators 
consisted of real radars, located in a set of cubicles, and fed with simulated signals. 
Individuals or teams could learn the skills of radar plotting under the guidance of an 
instructor working at a separate master console. Other navigational aids in the 
simulator were fairly basic and certainly did not include a visual scene. 
Bridge simulators with a nocturnal visual scene made their appearance in the 1970’s 
and allowed teams to conduct simulated passages in a realistic environment but with 
only a few lights available to indicate other vessels and shore lights. It was apparent 
from the casualty of the Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) “Metulla” in 1974, in 
which the vessel grounded in the Magellan Straits with two pilots and watch keepers 
present on the bridge, that bridge teams were not working effectively in supporting 
each other or the pilot. Simulator-based training courses were introduced primarily to 
train the skills of passage planning and the importance of the Master/Pilot relationship 
(Gyles and Salmon 1978). This training initiative developed into the Bridge Team 
Management (BTM) courses that are conducted today on many simulators world-wide 
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and contain many of the elements to be found in Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
courses developed in other industries, such as aviation. These courses were developed 
to focus on the non-technical skills of flight operations and include group dynamics, 
leadership, interpersonal communications and decision making. (Helmreich and 
Merritt 1998). Bridge Resource Management (BRM) courses are a more recent 
initiative, adapted directly from the aviation model for training the non-technical 
skills of resource management, and are not always based on the use of simulators. 
The 1980s saw the introduction of Engine Room simulators and towards the end of 
that decade, cargo operations simulators also became available. These types of 
simulator have primarily been used to train officers in the handling of operations, 
including fault finding and problem diagnosis, and increasingly to train teams in the 
skills of systems, resource and risk management. Many types of simulator: bridge, 
engine and cargo control room, have tended to emphasise a physically realistic 
environment in which these exercises occur, although the use of PC-based simulators 
for training some tasks is increasingly widespread. In some parts of the world, 
simulators have been developed which have very high levels of physical fidelity, for 
example, multi-storey engine room mock-ups and bridge simulators including features 
such as 360 degrees day/night views, pitch and roll, and full vibration and noise 
effects. 
The only mandatory requirements in the maritime domain for the development of the 
non-technical skills of crisis management are those of the International Maritime 
Organization’s (IMO) Seafarer’s Training, Certification and Watchkeeping Code 
(International Maritime Organization, 1995). Table A-V/2 of this code specifies the 
minimum standard of competence in crisis management and human behaviour skills 
for those senior officers who have responsibility for the safety of passengers in 
emergency situations. The competence assessment criteria detailed within the Code 
are not based on specific overt behaviours, but rather on generalised statements of 
performance outputs, and as such are highly subjective and open to interpretation. 
Although these standards of competence indicate that IMO recognises the need for 
non-technical management skills, both the standards and their assessment criteria are 
immature in comparison with the understanding of non-technical skills, and their 
assessment, within an industry such as civil aviation. 
In summary, resource management training to mitigate risk has become established in 
the curricula of many maritime training establishments. Courses take a variety of 
forms and cover both deck and engine room disciplines. The courses are often 
simulator-based, but not always, and their syllabuses reflect CRM training in other 
industries. As can be seen from the history of this development, most major training 
initiatives have resulted from the lessons learnt from a succession of casualties. The 
next section reviews three recent casualties and the resource, risk and crisis 
management issues they raise.  
2. Case Studies in the Failure of Resource, Risk and Crisis  
Management. 
A recent review of accident databases from the USA, UK, Canada and Australia 
confirms that human error continues to be the dominant factor in maritime accidents 
and reveals that in 70% of recorded incidents attributed to human error, failures in 
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situation assessment and awareness predominate (ABS, 2004).  The following three 
case studies illustrate how such factors contribute to accident causation.   
2.1 Case Study 1: The Grounding of the “Royal Majesty”. 
 
 2.1.1 The circumstances 
 
In June 1995 the passenger vessel “Royal Majesty”, with 1509 passengers aboard, 
went aground near Nantucket Island on a voyage from Bermuda to Boston. The vessel 
was fitted with an integrated bridge system including an autopilot which, when 
engaged, was capable of steering the vessel along a pre-programmed route using the 
vessel’s GPS system as a primary source of positional information. In the case of 
insufficient satellite data, the GPS was designed to default to a Dead Reckoning (DR) 
mode. The autopilot, however, was not capable of recognising any change in GPS 
status and thus, with the GPS in DR mode, was only able to continue navigation 
without correction for wind or current.  
 
The autopilot was set on departure from Bermuda, but after about an hour the GPS 
defaulted to DR mode (probably as a result of a loose connection on the receiver 
cable), and for the next 34 hours, the vessel was navigating on DR through the 
autopilot. At no time during this period was this situation detected by the bridge team, 
so that when the vessel eventually grounded, she was 17 miles off course.  
 
The official National Transportation Safety Board report gave as the probable cause 
of the grounding: 
 
“the watch officers’ overreliance on the automated features of the 
integrated bridge system , Majesty Cruise Line’s failure to ensure that 
its officers were adequately trained in the automated features of the 
integrated bridge system and in the implications of this automation for 
bridge resource management, the deficiencies in the design and 
implementation of the integrated bridge system and in the procedures 
for its operation, and the second officer’s failure to take corrective 
action after several cues indicated the vessel was off course.” (NTSB, 
1997). 
  
2.1.2 The analysis  
 
x This case illustrates the problems of over reliance on the available technology by 
the bridge team. All the officers have been lulled into a false sense of security by a 
modern system that appears to be protecting the vessel but is vulnerable. Their 
understanding of the system and its weaknesses is incomplete. 
 
x The reliance on technology has led the team to use only a limited number of 
sources of information to determine the vessel’s position. Other sources are 
ignored and not used for cross-checking. This deviance from normal watch 
keeping practice has gradually become the accepted norm by all members of the 
team. 
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x There were several opportunities when both the chief officer and the second 
officer on their respective watches could have avoided the grounding through the 
observation of buoys visually and by use of the radar. However, because of their 
over confidence in the GPS, the team is in a “mind set” where conflicting 
evidence is not analysed critically and assumptions are not questioned. The result 
is that the individuals remain confirmed in their bias towards the information from 
one source and remain in blissful ignorance of the real situation.  
2.2 Case Study 2: The Grounding of the “Green Lily”. 
 
2.2.1 The circumstances 
 
On 18th November 1997, the 3,624 grt Bahamian registered vessel “Green Lily” sailed 
from Lerwick in the Shetland Islands with a cargo of frozen fish for the Ivory Coast.  
The weather on departure was bad with wind speeds increasing to severe gale force 9. 
The following morning, while hove to about 15 miles south-east of the island of 
Bressay in the Shetland Isles in storm force 10 winds, a sea water supply line 
fractured in the engine room. The engineers controlled the flooding and pumping out 
had begun when the main engine stopped. Unsuccessful attempts were made to restart 
the engine while the vessel drifted northwards towards Bressay.  Shetland Coastguard 
was advised and three tugs, the Lerwick RNLI lifeboat and a coastguard helicopter 
prepared to proceed to the casualty. 
Attempts were made by two of the tugs to secure a line and tow the “Green Lily” 
away from land but although initially successful, each line parted.  The starboard 
anchor was released and the third tug attempted to snag the cable and pull her head to 
wind, but the cable parted.  At this time, the lifeboat rescued five crewmen, including 
two injured, from the ship’s deck. The ten remaining crew members were rescued by 
the Coastguard helicopter but the winchman, who had remained on the deck of the 
ship, was swept into the sea and lost. The “Green Lily” went aground and started to 
break up. The investigation by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), 
published in June 1999, advised the cause of the grounding was: 
“the lack of propulsion and failure to restart the main engine to arrest 
the drift of the vessel towards the shore in the prevailing 
environmental conditions. Contributory causes included flooding of 
the engine room, failure to reset the mechanical over-speed trip, 
inadequate knowledge of the cooling water system, failure of the 
towage attempts and inadequate teamwork” (MAIB, 1999; pp. 9) 
2.2.2 The Analysis 
x An initial technical failure precipitated events and was compounded by a 
hostile environment and further technical problems and failures. The situation 
was escalating in severity. An emergency was becoming a crisis, but the actors 
in this tragedy did not have the benefit of hindsight to read the ‘script’. 
x The available emergency plans, which tended to be procedures based on single 
failures, were not applicable. The individuals involved were forced to fall back 
on their experience to cope with an increasingly complex and unpredictable set 
of circumstances. 
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x Initial diagnosis of the technical failure was incorrect and led to a faulty but 
persistent mental model of the situation. In this case, the chief and second 
engineers, together with the electrical engineer, failed to understand why the 
main engine stopped and were consequently unable to restart it. They believed 
that the main engine failure was due to the effect of the flooding, previously 
caused by the fracture of the sea suction pipe. The probable reason for the 
main engine stoppage was actually due to the mechanical over-speed trip 
either not being reset or reset incorrectly.  
x Awareness of the overall situation by individuals was based on incomplete or 
inaccurate information. In this case, both the Master, based on his calculation 
of drift, and the engineers, were over optimistic in their belief that a tow would 
be available before the ship ran aground. Meanwhile, the skippers of the 
rescue craft had unexpressed reservations about various aspects of the 
operation including the appropriateness of some of the towing gear, the 
weather conditions and sea room, and the ability of the ship’s crew to handle 
the towlines. 
x Individuals and units were separated physically and several agencies were 
interacting through various forms of communication. In these circumstances, it 
was very difficult for the key players to communicate meaningfully and 
maintain a shared and agreed awareness of the rapidly changing situation. 
2.3 Case Study 3: The “Diamant” and “Northern Merchant” Collision. 
 
 2.3.1 The circumstances 
 
On the morning of 6th January 2002, two ferries were crossing the Dover Strait in 
reduced visibility of less than 200 metres.  The “Diamant” had sailed from Oostende 
and was heading for Dover.  The “Northern Merchant” was heading to Dunkerque 
from Dover.  Both vessels were travelling at close to normal cruising speed: 
“Diamant” a high-speed craft was travelling at 29 knots, and the “Northern 
Merchant”, a Ro-Ro ferry, was travelling at 21 knots.  If both vessels had continued 
their course and speed, their paths would have taken them to within half a mile of one 
another.  However, at just over a mile apart, the bridge teams started to question the 
assumptions they had made about each other’s probable course of action and started to 
implement course changes, but not speed changes, that would, they believed, put a 
greater distance between themselves.  At 0952 they collided. 
The MAIB report lists 18 possible causes and contributing factors in this accident, 
including the unsafe speed of both vessels, bridge team failures in risk assessment, 
violation of collision regulations and adherence to an “unwritten rule” that high speed 
craft will keep clear of all other craft. (MAIB, 2003; pp. 43-44) 
2.3.2 The Analysis 
x This case is similar to previous incidents in reduced visibility in which the 
participants have violated regulations and operational practices. Both teams are 
making assumptions about the intentions and actions of others and, at the speeds 
involved, have little time to rectify the developing crisis situation when they 
realise what is actually happening. 
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x However, this case also raises questions about the ability of training to provide 
solutions to this type of problem. The actors in this case were all experienced and 
professional officers who know the rules perfectly well but, for one reason or 
another, violate them, probably as a matter of routine. The root causes of these 
violations may not be resolved simply by sending “offenders” on remedial training 
in the interpretation of radar interpretation or the collision regulations.   
x Organisational culture plays an important part in reinforcing the appropriate 
behaviours required. If an organisation’s shore-based management team pays “lip 
service” to its own operating policies and procedures by failing to implement them 
on the vessels and, at the same time, tacitly accepts or rewards deviant behaviour, 
then the individual officers on board will adopt a similar cultural attitude.   
3. Advances in Research for Maritime Training and Assessment.  
In the year 2000, the Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA), following a 
recommendation of the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) in response to 
the loss of the “Green Lily”, awarded a project to a research team at Warsash 
Maritime Centre. The remit of the project was to investigate the potential use of 
simulators for training in the handling of escalating emergencies.  This project 
enabled the researchers to review current concepts and models in the field of crisis 
management across a range of safety critical industries and to conduct a survey of 
expert opinion on the optimal training and assessment regimes for handling escalating 
emergencies (Barnett et al 2002). One of the findings of this study was the recognition 
of the essential differences between emergency and crisis situations and the need for 
different training syllabuses to address them. 
An emergency can be defined as a situation outside normal operating parameters 
where corrective decisions and actions are based on documented procedures. In the 
maritime context, examples might be “Man overboard”, steering gear failure or a 
report of a fire in a cabin. Emergency procedures can be trained effectively both on 
board and at onshore training establishments.  
A crisis differs from an emergency in that successful decisions and actions may not 
necessarily be based on documented procedures. Appropriate pre-defined responses 
may not exist, and even if they do, in practice they may have conflicting requirements.  
Those responsible for handling crises will have to think through the situation, and 
respond in creative and flexible ways. 
This distinction between emergencies and crises has a significant impact on the 
training requirements for their management. Training in handling emergencies may 
simply be training in following pre-prescribed procedures and drills. Training in crisis 
management is likely to require a much more demanding approach to practise the 
situational awareness and decision making skills required in these situations.  
So what skills are required to handle crises? There is now considerable evidence from 
both military and civilian sources that the main requirements are for the high-level 
cognitive skills of problem solving and decision making. Crichton and Flin (2002) 
suggest that, at its most simplified, there are two fundamental and inter-related skill 
requirements: 
 
x Situation assessment – “what’s the problem” 
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x Decision making – “what shall I do”. 
 
The following sections describe three research-led initiatives in the field of maritime 
CRM, risk and crisis management currently being undertaken at Warsash: 
1. To develop more effective CRM training courses through a better 
theoretical understanding of the nature of shared situational awareness and 
mental models in “real world” maritime operations. 
2. To identify a set of behavioural markers for assessing the non-technical 
skills of crisis management. 
3. To explore the role of organisational factors in safe operation, in 
recognition of the limitations of operator training to prevent the 
reoccurrence of accidents. 
3.1 Situational Awareness, Mental Models and the Paradox of RPD 
Modern concepts for understanding decision-making have progressed from classic 
rational choice models to ones that try to reflect the way decisions are actually made 
in the real world. The most influential of these models is the naturalistic decision-
making (NDM) model and has been defined as follows: 
 “The study of NDM asks how experienced people, working as 
individuals or groups in dynamic, uncertain, and often fast-paced 
environments, identify and assess their situation, make decisions and 
take actions whose consequences are meaningful to them and the 
larger organization in which they operate.” (Pruitt et al, 1997) 
This definition reveals a number of characteristics of the situations in which NDM 
takes place: 
x The situations in which decisions are made are uncertain, unpredictable and 
dangerous. 
x Knowledge of the situation is incomplete, and constantly changing.  
x The consequences of decisions and actions based on poor situational 
awareness are potentially catastrophic. 
x Experienced people, not novices, generally conduct decision making in such 
situations.  
Another important feature of NDM is that, unlike classical models of decision 
making, where the objective is to provide optimal decisions, the objective for real 
world decision makers is to arrive at actions based on decisions that will satisfy the 
immediate concerns of the situation, without those decisions necessarily having to be 
the best ones. There are a number of different models within an NDM approach to 
describe the process by which decisions are made. The dominant model is the 
Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model. Orasanu (1997) provides a 
comprehensive description of the process: 
“Its basic principle is that experts use their knowledge to recognise a 
problem situation as an instance of a type, and then retrieve from their 
store of patterns in memory an appropriate response associated with 
that particular problem type. The response is evaluated for adequacy 
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in the present context, and if it passes, it is adopted. If it is found 
wanting, either another interpretation of the situation is sought or a 
second level response is retrieved and evaluated.” 
The RPD model works well to describe decision-making situations in the maritime 
context. But the model does have serious implications for the training of “real world” 
decision-making skills.  
In crisis situations, just when the expert needs to draw on a reliable repertoire, the 
situation is unpredictable and atypical, so no repertoire can be called upon. The crisis 
handler has to revert to a creative response i.e. they have to think their way through 
the novel situation. The primary justification for the direct training for crisis 
management is based in the belief that by exposing individuals or teams to a variety of 
potential crisis scenarios, their ‘patterns’ or mental models of situations will be 
enriched, thus enhancing their situational awareness techniques and their repertoires 
of decision making. The key to this approach is in the ‘richness’ of the mental models 
developed by the individual or team, but paradoxically, the problem is that if the 
training scenarios are too prescriptive, then the learned repertoires may be 
inappropriate to the real emergency encountered. 
This repertoire driven process can lead to dangerous consequences when facing an 
unpredictable situation. On the one hand, the decision-maker may derive increasingly 
bizarre hypotheses to explain the available information cues – the “kaleidoscopic” 
effect; or the decision-maker may become fixated on one pattern, refusing to change 
repertoires in the face of obviously conflicting information – the “mind-set” problem 
as exhibited by the “Green Lily” engineers and the watch keepers on the “Royal 
Majesty”. 
Decision-making is a skill. Like all skills, it may be honed through practice. By 
reducing cognitive load through practice, experts will be less stressed than novices in 
threatening situations. In addition to specific contextual skills, there is a set of more 
general cognitive skills involved in situational awareness and decision making. The 
direct development of such generalised critical thinking skills, which encourage team 
members to question their assumptions about their assessment of situations, might 
counteract the RPD paradox and the consequences of stress. 
In summary, the nature of crisis situations suggest that there are at least two specific 
training requirements for the development of situational awareness and decision 
making skills: 
1 To provide exercise scenarios in which the individual’s mental models of 
systems, situations and the cues by which they recognise them, may be 
enriched; 
2 To develop a general critical thinking skill which resolves conflicting 
information and tests the assumptions on which decisions are based. 
Based on the principles described above, an innovative CRM training course is 
currently being developed at Warsash.  The course uses a number of forms of 
simulation, including role playing exercises and full mission simulator exercises, 
which combine both bridge and engine room teams. In addition to the specific 
development of critical thinking skills and the enhancement of situational awareness, 
the objectives of the course also include the development of the other non-technical 
skills of CRM, for example, communication, team co-ordination and leadership 
development.   
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The course builds the learning experience from classroom lectures on theoretical 
aspects, followed by brief exercises to practice specific techniques, culminating in 
simulator-based scenarios in which the various elements can be brought together. The 
final exercises bring both bridge and engine room teams together, through linked 
simulators, where complex evolving situations have to be managed by both teams.   
The development of the course is leading to further research. A major issue is to what 
extent will the CRM skills, learned in a simulated environment, transfer to the real 
world? It is hoped to use questionnaires to follow up course participants to assess 
what has been retained from their training after a defined period.  
Two other research issues are of particular interest in the maritime context. The first is 
related to the sharing of situational awareness between members in a team and also 
between distributed teams. Both the “Diamant” and the “Green Lily” cases 
demonstrate difficulties in communicating mental models between teams on the same 
vessel and/or between separate agencies involved in a crisis situation. Video 
observations from our own simulator exercises suggest that team leaders can find it 
difficult to articulate their understanding of the situation to other team members. This 
difficulty is not limited to intra-team communication, but as the “Green Lily” case 
shows, can work at an inter-team level too. In addition, it is apparent that one team 
can easily become oblivious to the information needs of a separate team when under 
stress, for example, bridge and engine room teams habitually fail to update each other 
as a training scenario unfolds. Measuring the effectiveness of synchronous training 
and the characterisation of behavioural markers for distributed teams represent 
interesting challenges to the maritime training community. 
The international shipping industry shares with the offshore industry a similar 
working environment in that multi-national, multi-cultural crews work and socialise 
together in an isolated environment for months on end. Cultural and linguistic effects 
on team working is a particularly challenging area of research. Our experience from 
simulator training suggests that different national cultures do work together in 
noticeably different ways, for example, a UK/US team does display a more 
individualistic way of sharing situational awareness than those from a more 
“collective” culture (Hofstede, 1991).  Questions that have yet to be addressed 
include: 
What effects are produced by cultural factors and how may they be characterised? 
What is the impact on the overall safety performance of a team, especially in stressful 
situations, by placing individuals from one culture into a different culturally based 
team? 
3.2 Towards the Development of a Maritime Assessment Framework 
A PhD research programme is also currently being undertaken at Warsash that is 
intended to provide an understanding of how a behavioural marker system could be 
used to assess the competence in crisis management of merchant marine engineering 
officers. 
Behavioural markers that could be used to assess competence in crisis management 
within the context of a simulated merchant vessel’s engine room control room are 
being determined. Experiments are being undertaken to investigate the efficacy of 
these behavioural markers to assess competence in crisis management, and it is 
intended that this research will then go on to show if these behavioural markers can be 
used as the basis for an objective competence assessment framework. 
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The aims of this research programme are: 
1 To understand how behavioural markers can be used to objectively assess 
competence in crisis management of merchant marine engineering officers. 
2 To develop and validate an assessment framework that utilises specific overt 
behavioural markers to facilitate the objective assessment of competence in 
crisis management of merchant marine engineering officers. 
3.3 Organisational Factors 
The argument has been made earlier in this paper that the training and assessment of 
operators can only ever be part of the solution to reducing accidents. Organisational 
factors also play a significant part in accident causation. So what are the research 
issues in maritime operations, at an organisational level, which need addressing? 
The analysis of human factors in accident causation is still relatively immature in the 
maritime world. Although databases held by the MAIB and other parties interested in 
the causal factors of accidents – e.g. insurers and classification societies – do include 
human error taxonomies, little analysis is undertaken to identify trends or patterns. 
Even less analysis has been attempted in assessing the significance or frequency of 
organisational factors such as the incidence of commercial pressure or the effects of 
organisational culture on accident causation. 
The differences in organisational culture between shipping companies is a well known 
phenomenon, but there has been little work on understanding the effects of 
organisational culture on safe and efficient performance.  In much the same way as we 
are striving to identify a set of behavioural markers to assess the competence of 
individuals, so there is a need to establish a set of organisational metrics to determine 
the competence of shipping companies to perform safely. 
Not enough is known about the parameters governing functioning and performance of 
management systems.  There is little research evidence to indicate what makes a 
management system work or indeed what prevents it from working.  Equally, not 
enough is known about the metrics that enable the status of a management system to 
be determined. Ideally, what is required is a set of “leading” indicators that will 
predict future performance so that interventions can be made before accidents occur.  
The research conundrum is, first, to agree what constitutes organisational behaviour; 
second, in deciding which “behaviours” are leading indicators of proficiency; and 
third, in designing methods that can measure these indicators accurately. 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
As in similar safety-critical industries, the analysis of maritime accidents over the 
years has revealed shortcomings in the ability of operators to manage both resources 
and crises. CRM training has been seen increasingly as a fundamental part of the 
human error management philosophy. The International Maritime Organization 
recognises the need for non-technical or resource management skills, but both the 
standards of competence and their assessment criteria are immature in comparison 
with civil aviation. 
Studies of recent casualties involving human failures in resource, risk and crisis 
management confirms that lack of situational awareness is the predominant factor in 
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operator error. Analysis of recent casualties also suggest that CRM training alone, 
although important, may not be a panacea for operator error and that organisational 
factors must also be taken into account.  
A theoretical understanding of naturalistic decision making suggests that there are at 
least two specific training requirements for the development of situational awareness 
and decision making skills. Firstly, there is a need to enrich the individual’s mental 
models of systems, situations and the cues by which they recognise them, and 
secondly, to develop a general critical thinking skill which resolves conflicting 
information and tests the assumptions on which decisions are based.  
An innovative CRM training course is currently being developed at Warsash.  The 
course uses a number of forms of simulation, including role playing exercises and full 
mission simulator exercises, which combine both bridge and engine room teams to 
develop the skills of communication, team co-ordination and management and 
leadership development. 
In setting an agenda for future maritime research in this area, the following issues are 
suggested for consideration: 
x If the direct training of resource and crisis management skills is pursued, to 
what extent will such skills, learned in a simulated environment, transfer to the 
real world?  
x What are the optimum training environments to ensure effective transfer? 
x  How can these non-technical skills be assessed most effectively, both at the 
level of the individual and at the level of the team?  
x What behavioural markers, both at individual and team level, predict safe 
performance?  
x In multi-national environments, how may cultural factors be characterised and 
what is the impact on overall safety performance of cultural differences?  
x We know that organisational factors also play a significant part in accident 
causation but how can their significance, frequency and impact be established?  
x How does organisational culture impact on accident causation?  
x Finally, what are the metrics that enable the status of an organisation’s safety 
management system to be determined? 
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